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985 Bruckner Blvd. Owners LLC v Fuentes
2022 NY Slip Op 51054(U)
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Decided on October 27, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County
985 Bruckner Boulevard Owners LLC, Petitioner,
against
Daisy Fuentes, Respondents (Tenants).

L & T Index No. 3051932022
For Petitioner: Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C.
For Respondent: Mobilization for Justice, Inc.
Shorab Ibrahim, J.
RECITATION, AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 2219(A), OF THE PAPERS CONSIDERED
IN THE REVIEW OF THIS MOTION BY THE RESPONDENT TO DISMISS THE
PROCEEDING: NYSCEF Document No. 11.[FN1]
UPON THE FOREGOING CITED PAPERS, THE DECISION/ORDER IN THIS
MOTION IS AS FOLLOWS:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Petitioner commenced this holdover proceeding alleging respondent breached her lease
because of alleged repeated objectionable conduct. Respondent seeks dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action. The motion is unopposed.
On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a) (7) for failure to
state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all
facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible
favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable
legal theory. (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87, 614 NYS2d 972 [1994]; Breytman v
Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703704, 864 NYS2d 70 [2nd Dept 2008]). A CPLR
3211 (a) (7) motion "must be denied 'unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed
by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute
exists regarding it.'" (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1182, 904 NYS2d 153 [2nd Dept 2010]
quoting Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275, 401 NYS2d 182 [1977]).
Respondent seeks dismissal on three (3) grounds:
(a) that the notice to cure does not advise what must be done to cure the alleged
reach/conduct;
(b) that the notice of termination fails to state sufficient facts to conclude the
allegations in the notice to cure were, in fact, not cured, and;
(c) that the notice(s) do not properly plead a continuous course of conduct required
to support the nuisance claim.
The court addresses each argument in turn.
DISCUSSION
"A notice to cure that forms the basis for a petition initiating a holdover proceeding
must set forth sufficient facts to establish grounds for the tenant's eviction, and inform the
tenant as to how the tenant violated the lease, as well as the conduct required to prevent
eviction." (Westhampton Cabins & Cabanas Owners Corp. v Westhampton Bath & Tennis
Club Owners Corp., 62 AD3d 987, 988, 882 NYS2d 124 [2nd Dept 2009] [emphasis added]
citing Domen Holding Co. v Aranovich, 1 NY3d 117, 769 NYS2d 785 [2003]).
The October 7, 2021 notice to cure alleges the respondent engaged in verbal and
physical altercations with other tenants and building employees, acted aggressively toward
both, made unfounded allegations against employees, and was observed without pants and/or

a shirt numerous times. Eight (8) numbered paragraphs allege objectionable acts on specific
dates through June 21, 2021. Paragraph nine (9) alleges the respondent continues to engage
in such behavior. (see NYSCEF Doc. 1, p. 35). The notice advises respondent that she "must
correct the above conditions by October 23, 2021, otherwise the landlord shall be forced to
commence legal proceedings against you to terminate your tenancy." (id.)
A predicate notice is sufficient if it is reasonable in view of all attendant circumstances.
(see 542 Holding Corp v Prince Fashions, Inc, 46 AD3d 309, 310, 848 NYS2d 37 [1st Dept
2007]; Oxford Towers Co, LLC v Leites, 41 AD3d 144, 837 NYS2d 131 [1st Dept 2007]).
Here, advising respondent to "correct" the objectionable conduct [by a date certain] warns
her to stop such conduct. A cure occurs when the specified conduct stops. (see Woodlawn
278305, LLC v Barnett, 72 Misc 3d 1208(A), *6, 2021 NY Slip Op 50675(U) [Civ Ct,
Bronx County 2021]).
As such, affording petitioner every favorable inference, dismissal on this ground is
denied.
The November 21, 2021 termination notice restates the allegations in the notice to cure
and adds, "You continue to engage in antisocial, disruptive, destructive, and dangerous
behavior in and around the building after the Notice to Cure expired. Other tenants and
building employees have advised that they are concerned for their safety and well being due
to your presence [sic] violent and aggressive behavior in the building. You were observed
smashing a glass door on your floor of the building. You have exhibited abusive and
dangerous conduct on an ongoing basis as of November 15, 2021." (see NYSCEF Doc. 1 at
p. 33).
In view of all the attendant circumstances, the termination notice sufficiently alleges the
respondent's failure to comply with the notice to cure. Though more specificity is preferable,
its absence is not necessarily fatal. (see McGoldrick v DeCruz, 195 Misc 2d 414, 415 758
NYS2d 756 [App Term 1st Dept 2003] ("A predicate notice in a holdover summary
proceeding need not lay bare a landlord's trial proof, and will be upheld in the face of a
'jurisdictional' challenge where, as here, the notice is 'as a whole sufficient adequately to
advise ... tenant and to permit it to frame a defense'")).
The allegations in the termination notice are sufficient to allow the respondent to
prepare a defense. (see 69 EM LLC v Mejia, 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 29 NYS3d 849 [App Term,
1st Dept 2015]). Given the relative detail of the allegations listed in the notice to cure and

restated in the [*2]notice of termination,[FN2] the termination notice meets the minimum
standard of reasonableness, at least to survive a CPLR § 3211(a)(7) motion.
In Pinehurst Constr. Corp. v Schlesinger, the Appellate Division found that a notice of
termination "setting forth no names, dates or specific instances of the misconduct," described
"a nuisance ... with sufficient detail to have allowed tenant to prepare a defense." (38 AD3d
474, 475, 833 NYS2d 428 [1st Dept 2007]).
This court also agrees with the thoughtful analysis in 1123 Realty LLC v Treanor, (62
Misc 3d 326, 332333, 86 NYS3d 381 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2018]), where the court found
the "reasonableness" standard (as noted in Hughes v Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 AD2d 4, 18, 651
NYS2d 418 [1st Dept 1996]) is not susceptible to a brightline rule. Rather, "reasonableness"
is a fact specific determination based on a totality of the circumstances.
Here, the termination notice, in conjunction with the notice to cure, adequately apprises
the tenant of the grounds upon which it was based, thus permitting her to prepare a defense.
(see 1123 Realty LLC v Treanor, 62 Misc 3d at 332). The fourweek delay in issuing the
notice of termination (which includes language that the alleged behavior continues postcure
period) indicates that petitioner did not reflexively issue the termination notice. (see id. at
333; see also Jericho Project Lessee v MarteTravera, 67 Misc 3d 1204(A), *5, 2020 NY
Slip Op 50391(U) [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2020]; compare 76 W. 86th St. Corp. v Junas, 55
Misc 3d 596, 599, 45 NYS3d 921 [Civ Ct, New York County 2017] (notice of termination
dated just two days after the date respondent was required to cure); 3167 Astoria Corp. v
Landaira, 54 Misc 3d 131(A), 52 NYS3d 248 [App Term, 2nd Dept 2017] (oneday gap
between cure date and service of notice of termination where grounds were for nuisance and
failure to give access)).[FN3]
Respondent may also request amplification of the postcure allegations through a bill of
particulars. (see Chelsea 19 Assocs. v Coyle, 22 Misc 3d 140(A), 881 NYS2d 362 [App
Term, 1st Dept 2009] ("Further information concerning the tenant's alleged failure to
properly cure the noise condition was appropriately provided in landlord's bill of
particulars."); City of New York v Valera, 216 AD2d 237, 238 628 NYS2d 695 [1995]).
This court is not persuaded that 3167 Astoria Corp. v Landaira represents any change
in law, notwithstanding that many courts, including this one, have cited to it for the
proposition that a notice of termination must include new facts that confirm that a respondent
failed to cure. (see e.g. Reinozo v Eskander, 2017 NYLJ LEXIS 2151 [Civ Ct, Queens

County 2017]; Bell v Han, 2017 NYLJ LEXIS 2395 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2017]; BEC
Continuum Owners v Taylor, [*3]2018 NYLJ LEXIS 1821 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2018]; ML
1188 Grand Concourse LLC v Khan, 60 Misc 3d 1215(A), 2018 NY Slip Op 51139(U) [Civ
Ct, Bronx County 2018]; Rochdale Vil., Inc. v Stone, 66 Misc 3d 737, 116 NYS3d 553 [Civ
Ct, Queens County 2019]; 2704 Univ. Ave. Realty v Thompson, 63 Misc 3d 1222(A), 2019
NY Slip Op 50652(U) [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2019]; Fen Xiu Chen v Salvador, 71 Misc 3d
1225(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50499(U) [Civ Ct, Queens County 2021]).[FN4]
First, the termination notice in Landaira literally failed to state that that the tenant had
not cured. (54 Misc 3d 131(A) ("The notice to terminate, served one day after the cure period
had expired, did not allege that tenant had failed to cure the alleged defaults specified in the
notice to cure."). Dismissal was expressly granted on this "narrow ground." (see 1123 Realty
LLC v Treanor, 62 Misc 3d at 334).
In any event, just months ago, the Appellate Term, First Department, opined (albeit in
dicta) that notices (including the notice of termination) "were reasonable 'in view of the
attendant circumstances' since they set forth casespecific allegations tending to support
landlord's nuisance claim with sufficient detail to have allowed respondents to prepare a
defense and otherwise satisfied the specificity requirements" the Rent Stabilization Code.
(Shwesinger v Perlis, 75 Misc 3d 135(A), 2022 NY Slip Op 50550(U) [App Term, 1st Dept
2022] (internal citations omitted).
The June 8, 2018 notice to cure in Schwesinger is eleven (11) pages and lists more than
fifty (50) specific allegations of objectionable conduct occurring from 2013 through May
2018. (see NYSCEF Doc. 77 under Index No. 67376/18). The notice of termination lists the
same conduct set forth in the notice to cure, and states,
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE, that your tenancy of the Apartment is
hereby terminated effective July 16, 2018, upon the grounds that you are violating
a substantial obligation of your lease and tenancy and you have failed to cure such
violation after written notice from the landlord dated June 8, 2018 (the "Notice to
Cure") that the violation or violations cease by June 27, 2018, that date having
been more than ten (10) days after service of the Notice to Cure (a copy of the
Notice to Cure, together with proof of service is annexed hereto and made a part
hereof. (NYSCEF Doc. 76 under Index No. 67376/18).
The notice of termination contains no new facts. It merely alleges failure to comply with the
notice to cure. However, just as termination notices ought not be mere formalities reflexively
issued immediately after the cure period expires, dismissal should not be granted just because

a notice to termination does not include postcure period facts.
For these reasons, and affording petitioner every favorable inference, this second branch
of the motion to dismiss is denied.
Nuisance imports a continuous invasion of rights—"a pattern of continuity or recurrence
of objectionable conduct" (Domen Holding Co. v Aranovich, 1 NY3d at 124, quoting Frank v
Park Summit Realty Corp., 175 AD2d 33, 34 [1st Dept 1991], mod on other grounds 79
NY2d 789 [1991]). Respondent argues the notices do not adequately plead a continuous
course of conduct.
The court disagrees. The notices detail multiple incidents from January 2020 through
November 2021, an almost twoyear period. These allegations of respondent's conduct are of
the type that may render the enjoyment of the building especially uncomfortable—indeed,
they may even be threatening and frightening—for other tenants and building staff. (Domen
Holding Co. v Aranovich, 1 NY3d at 124).
Aranovich is illustrative:
"While surely a high threshold of proof would be required for eviction, we cannot
conclude as a matter of law, as the courts below did, that dismissal of the
complaint was warranted. The notice clearly provides that nuisance is the ground
upon which plaintiff relies for tenants' eviction and sets forth the facts necessary to
establish that ground (see 9 NYCRR 2525.2 [a], [b]; 2524.3 [b]). The notice
provides factspecific examples of Sanders' outrageous conduct and details his use
of profanity, racial epithets and threats of violence against Ellis, his threats to
physically harm DeRosa and his actual use of violence against the superintendent."
(id.)
The court notes that the notice in Aranovich had only three (3) specific allegations and
the conduct took place over a five (5) year period. Here, there are more than twice as many
alleged bad acts over a twoyear period. In 129th St. Cluster Assoc. v Levy, the court held that
even if the "underlying incidents were 'sporadic,' the severity and circumstances under which
the incidents took place display an intolerance and aggression toward those living within the
building, and suggest that tenant is easily incensed and prone to threatening and frightening
outbursts, conduct that places the comfort and health of others in the building." (54 Misc 3d
128(A), *23, 50 NYS3d 27 [App Term, 1st Dept 2016]; see also Peters v Owens, 48 Misc
3d 128(A), 2015 NY Slip Op 50930(U) [App Term, 1st Dept 2015] (affirming trial court's
holding that the "tenant's belligerent and aggressive behavior placed an intolerable burden on
neighboring tenants and building staff.")).

The notices here indicate respondent's objectionable conduct is far from "sporadic."
For these reasons, and giving affording petitioner every favorable inference, the third
branch of the motion to dismiss is denied.
Answer
Respondent's request to file an answer is granted. The court notes the request is
unopposed. In any event, respondent should have the full benefit of counsel. (see E. 168th St.
Assocs. v Castillo, 60 Misc 3d 774, 780 79 NYS3d 485 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2018])
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent's motion to dismiss the proceeding is denied in all
respects. The motion for leave to serve and file an answer is granted. The proposed answer
attached to NYSCEF Doc. 11 is deemed served and filed. The matter is adjourned to
November 22, 2022 at 9:30 AM for a pretrial conference. Any motions must be made
returnable on that date. This constitutes the decision and order of the court. It will be posted
on NYSCEF.
Dated: October 27, 2022
SO ORDERED,
Bronx, NY
SHORAB IBRAHIM, JHC
Footnotes
Footnote 1:Respondent did not file each document individually. Thus, NYSCEF Doc. 11
includes the notice of motion, memorandum of law, attorney affirmation, and proposed
answer.
Footnote 2:see Respondent's Memorandum of Law, NYSCEF Doc. 11 at p. 9 ("For each of
the allegations which predate the cure period, the Termination Notice includes specific dates,
as well as relatively detailed descriptions of the specific persons and behavior involved with
each allegation.").
Footnote 3:see also 340 Clifton Pl. LLC v Legette, 2018 NYLJ LEXIS 2830 [Civ Ct, Kings
County 2018] (oneday gap in nuisance claim based on harassment and drug use); CDC E
105th St Realty LP v Mitchel, 2017 NYLJ LEXIS 1195 (Civ Ct, NY County 2017) (twoday
gap for unsanitary and unsafe conditions ground); Second Hous. Co. Inc. v Davis, 2016

NYLJ LEXIS 4845 (Civ Ct, Queens County 2016) (finding lack of good faith on curable
nuisance ground where termination notice served one day after cure date)).
Footnote 4:This court in no way suggests any of these cases were incorrectly decided. After
all, determining the sufficiency of each notice requires a fact-specific analysis.
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